WIA Research

Case Law Reference

Michigan court decisions that shape what Woodbine can and can't do.

Amendment & Consent

Conlin v. Upton

313 Mich App 243 (2015)

No new covenant binds an owner without that owner's consent. A release provision is not an amendment provision.

Controlling authority. Woodbine has no amendment provision — only a 75% release provision. Mandatory dues cannot be imposed without unanimous consent of all 140 homeowners.

More detail

The Court of Appeals held that where original covenants contain only a release provision (allowing removal of restrictions), adding any new obligation requires unanimous consent. This is the case that most directly applies to Woodbine's dues situation.

Brown v. Martin

288 Mich App 727 (2010)

Amendments passed by less-than-unanimous vote during a renewal period don't bind dissenters until that period expires.

Currently irrelevant — Woodbine has no amendment provision at all. Would only matter if one were added (itself requiring unanimity).

Ardmore Park Subdivision Ass'n v. Simon

117 Mich App 57 (1982)

Where original covenants contain an amendment provision specifying a percentage, dissenting owners are bound by properly passed and recorded amendments.

Shows the contrast — Woodbine's restrictions lack such a provision, which is exactly why unanimous consent is required.

Association Standing

Civic Association of Hammond Lake Estates v. Hammond Lake Estates No. 3

271 Mich App 130 (2006)

A voluntary HOA with only ~65-70% membership has standing to enforce recorded deed restrictions in court.

Directly applicable. The WIA has standing to enforce existing restrictions even without 100% membership. Any individual lot owner also has independent standing.

More detail

This case is good news for Woodbine — it means the WIA can take legal action to enforce the existing deed restrictions (residential use, architectural control, etc.) without needing every homeowner to be a member.

Short-Term Rentals

Melvin R. Berlin Revocable Trust v. Rubin

Mich. Supreme Court, July 2025

Affirmed (3-3 equal division) that 'single family residence purposes' covenant prohibits STRs. Court of Appeals rulings now binding statewide.

Woodbine's 'private residence purposes only' language is virtually identical. If the restrictions are enforceable, the existing language would prohibit Airbnb/VRBO under this ruling.

More detail

The Michigan Supreme Court's equal division (3-3) means the Court of Appeals decision stands and is binding statewide. This is the most important STR case for Woodbine.

Eager v. Peasley

322 Mich App 174 (2017)

Renting property for short-term use is a commercial use, even if the activity occurring on the property is residential in nature.

Establishes the key principle: the nature of the rental transaction (short-term, profit-driven) makes it commercial regardless of what tenants do on the property.

Aldrich v. Sugar Springs

345 Mich App 181 (2023)

'Residential purposes only' restriction alone — even without explicit commercial-use prohibition — suffices to bar STRs.

Removes any argument that explicit anti-commercial language is needed. If enforceable, Woodbine's existing residential-use restriction would be sufficient — no additional anti-commercial language needed.

Cherry Home Ass'n v. Baker

COA, unpublished, Oct. 2021

Renting for days or weeks removes the permanent, private character; property functions as commercial lodging.

Reinforces the principle that STRs are fundamentally different from long-term residential use.

Timber Lake Drive v. Gribi

COA, Sept. 2025

Even long-term rentals can violate commercial-use restrictions when the owner treats property purely as a profit-making enterprise.

Extends the principle beyond short-term rentals to any purely commercial rental operation.

Alienation & Restraints

Sanborn v. McLean

233 Mich 227 (1925)

Restrictions in a common development scheme bind all lots if subsequent purchasers have actual or constructive notice (reciprocal negative easements).

Supports enforceability of Woodbine's uniform scheme — all lots are bound even if a specific lot's deed doesn't explicitly mention the restrictions.

Mandlebaum v. McDonell

29 Mich 78 (1874)

Michigan has a firm stance against restraints on alienation.

Direct prohibitions on resale (anti-flipping covenants, minimum hold periods) would likely be struck down.

LaFond v. Rumler

Mich. COA

Profit-sharing clauses on early resale are unreasonable restraints on alienation.

Minimum hold periods, rights of first refusal, or anti-flipping provisions would similarly be invalidated.